



2 DEC 1976

S-020/DN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR WARNING IN CRISIS OPERATIONS  
PAID/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Recommendations on SA/DDCI memo of 12 October, subj: Crisis Management

1. Linc Faurer and I have reviewed the memo you left with us, and have a few nitpicks and two major problems.
2. We both concur that the DCI needs and should have someone who has the task of providing him the specific staff support he needs in exercising his crisis management responsibilities. As discussed in our meeting, we suggest a title such as Crisis Management Advisor, and further cast our ballot for his being located amidst the IC Staff rather than either the NIO or CIA organization. You will probably find much greater leeway and freedom of expression in writing his job description as an "advisor" rather than as a "coordinator".

## 3. Our lesser problems are:

- a. Referring to page 3 of the Draft Checklist, second entry on the page:

Tone down "Production Priorities" to read "Production Suggestions". You have already given the NIO the task "arrange for and review all special crisis substantive intelligence products prepared for the DCI, WSAG and the President". We'll have a hard enough time fitting our part of that into our crisis routine without the implication that the NIO will judge the priority within which we respond to JCS/OSD needs.

- b. Again, page 3 of the Checklist, last entry:

Here and elsewhere, you seem to elevate the "Chief, NISR/TF" to some superior level which he in fact does not occupy. In this instance, he is specifically not a primary player in deciding what changes in collection priorities should be made. See our major problem below.

## 4. Our larger problems are these:

- a. You address the question of reviewing and adjusting collection resources in several places. You suggest that the "Community Crisis Collection Coordinator" recommend changes to the Collection Program

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
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DIA review  
completed.

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Managers, consulting with the NIO and Chief, NISR/TF. You later have the collection managers themselves doing the same thing in consultation with the NIO and the CCCC. Nowhere in your checklist do we see anything that assures us that someone (Director DIA, for example) who can articulate the urgent needs of the military commands or the DoD gets to play in this process or review and adjustment. The fundamental problem is expressed in your entry mid-page 3, where you get off on the track of reviewing the crisis collection requirements only with the collection managers and not with those who own the requirement.

b. Finally, your description of the position and functions of the DCI Representative to the JCS would not be acceptable to either the DIA or the J-3. To get to our objection, let's make sure we are talking about the same JCS crisis groups:

There are two basic ways in which the JCS handles a crisis situation, one formal the other informal:

- In the formal mode, the JCS execute their Emergency Operating Procedures, creating the Operations Planning Group (OPG) and certain subordinate groups, one of which is the Emergency Coordination Group (Intelligence) under the Director, DIA. CIA, State and NSA are invited members of the ECG (Intelligence). The OPG, chaired by the J-3, is staffed by the J-Staff, the services, and the defense agencies, including the DIA. Its members must have authority to give service or agency approval to joint actions in an extremely compressed time frame, bypassing the normal Joint Staff procedures. The different ECGs are created to support the OPG where external coordination is needed.

- In the informal mode (commonly used except in Joint Staff exercises), a Crisis Action Team is formed, again with service and agency representation, but without the formal authority to bypass normal Joint Staff procedures. There are no written provisions for anything resembling the ECG's to be formed concurrent with the CAT.


5. The problem DIA would have with your present description of the DCI rep to the JCS is that it simply conflicts with the responsibilities of the Director, DIA in his role as J-2 of the Joint Staff. The first three of the "Purposes of Representation" on page 6 are the responsibilities of the J-2/Director DIA. (The fourth purpose is currently the responsibility of the CIA desk officer in the NMCC in normal times, or perhaps the CIA member of the ECG (Intelligence) if such is established).

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6. The problem the J-3 would have with your Representative is that you have placed him explicitly in a position and with a purpose to do that which the Joint Staff has rightfully objected to, namely, to observe the planning of military options before they are ever accepted as valid by the Staff or the Chiefs, and to report to the world what the JCS is thinking about doing. I share the Joint Staff view that such would be totally confusing, misleading, and disruptive of the decisionmaking process at the national level.

7. My recommendation is that you solve this problem by either (1) acknowledging that the Director, DIA is in fact the DCI's representative to the JCS, or (2) establishing a DCI representative to the Director, DIA for crisis coordination matters rather than to the JCS.

8. We will be happy to continue this dialogue until solution.



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